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Abstract 
Payday lending is a relatively new and fast growing segment of the “fringe banking” 
industry.  This paper offers a comparative, descriptive analysis of the location patterns of 
traditional banks and payday lenders.  Utilizing a dataset at the Zip Code Tabulation Area 
level in North Carolina, we perform negative binomial regressions and find evidence 
supporting some, but not all common assertions about the location patterns of both types 
of institutions.  A key finding is that after controlling for many covariates, race is still a 
powerful predictor of the locations of both banks and payday lenders. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
During the last decade the U.S. has experienced dramatic growth in the number of non-bank 
lenders that offer relatively small, short-term, high-interest “payday” loans to credit-constrained 
borrowers.  These loans are simply cash advances backed by a personal check that is held by the 
payday lender for future deposit or by electronic access to a borrower’s bank account.  Although 
no federal data on payday lending is  available, industry reports indicate that the payday loan 
industry has grown from a few hundred outlets in the mid-1990s to more than 20,000 nationwide 
in 2001, generating between $10 and $20 billion in annual loan volume and over $2 billion in fee 
revenue.1 
As this type of non-bank lending has grown, consumer advocacy groups such as the 
Consumer Federation of America (CFA) and the U.S. Public Interest Research Group (PIRG) 
have voiced concerns about the lending practices within the industry, citing exorbitant interest 
rates and predatory lending practices that appear to be targeted at military families and 
uneducated, minority, or low-income borrowers (CFA/PIRG 2001).  In response, these advocacy 
groups have waged a national campaign to encourage state and federal officials to enact laws 
regulating the interstate operation of payday lenders, cap finance charges, and limit rollover 
borrowing.  Critics of payday lending also argue that the proliferation and location of payday 
lenders is evidence of the failure of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), originally enacted 
in 1977 (and revised in 1995) “to encourage depository institutions to help meet the credit needs 
of the local communities in which they are chartered.”2  Specifically, they claim that traditional 
                                                 
1 See Ernst, Farris and King (2003), Stegman (2003), Consumer Federation of America and U.S. Public 
Interest Research Group (2001) and Tanoue (2000).  Many of the national estimates of payday loan volume 
and fee income are produced by Stephens, Inc., a Little Rock, AR, investment firm that researches the 
payday loan industry. 
2 12 U.S.C. 2901 
 
banks have not met their CRA responsibilities, especially in low-income neighborhoods, allowing 
payday lenders to fill the resulting financial services vacuum.3   
Against this backdrop, our interest is in exploring what accounts for the growth of payday 
lending, and in particular where this growth has occurred.  Are payday lenders opportunistic 
predators, locating disproportionately in low-income and minority neighborhoods in order to prey 
on unsuspecting borrowers?  Or are they simply niche lenders responding to unmet demand?4  
Sorting out these competing claims is difficult, but is also critically important for analyzing and 
making policy decisions related to this industry.  However, rigorous analyses of the payday 
lending industry are few in number.  Stegman and Faris (2003) provide arguably the most 
comprehensive analysis of the payday lending industry but even they ultimately fail to distinguish 
between demand- and supply-side factors in determining the growth and location of payday 
lenders.5  More research is needed to better understand the factors affecting this industry in order 
to provide policy makers with better information to guide their policymaking decisions.   
Our approach in this paper is to systematically analyze the geographic location of payday 
lenders in North Carolina in an effort to explore the characteristics that make a geographic area 
likely to attract this type of lender.  In particular, our analysis focuses on differences in 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics that are frequently cited by consumer advocacy 
groups as causal factors in the location of payday lenders.  In addition, recognizing that payday 
lenders serve as both a substitute for and complement to traditional banking services, we compare 
the results from our geographic analysis of payday lenders to those obtained for traditional banks.  
We are particularly interested in determining whether there are characteristics of geographic areas 
                                                 
3 Avery, Bostic, Calem, and Canner (1997) fail to find evidence supporting this claim. They conclude that 
while the number of banking offices in low- and moderate-income areas fell significantly from the late 
1980s through the mid 1990s, it is likely “a response to excess capacity,” (p. 723) rather than a strategic 
decision to “benefit more affluent consumers at the expense of lower-income communities.” (p. 707)  
4 For an overview of the demand-side factors affecting the use of non-bank lenders, see Kidd (2004) and 
Elliehausen and Lawrence (2001).  Kidd (2004) and Tillett and Handlin (2003) discuss initiatives to bring 
the unbanked into the banking community.   
5 Stegman and Faris (2003) provide a detailed description of the payday lending industry, in particular the 
payday lending industry in North Carolina. 
 
that uniquely influence the location of payday lenders relative to traditional banks.  The particular 
questions that we seek to address include the following: 
• Is there empirical support for the claims that consumer advocates such as the CFA make 
regarding the location of payday lenders with regard to race, income, education, public 
assistance, and military bases? 
• Are the factors driving the geographic location of payday lenders different from those 
underlying the location of traditional banks?   
• Is there geographic complementarity or substitution between traditional banks and 
payday lenders?   
While our analysis will not settle the issue of whether payday lenders engage in predatory 
lending or are simply responding to demand for this type of service, our results shed additional 
light on current views of the payday lending industry and add to the growing pool of knowledge 
about this industry. 
2.  DATA SET CONSTRUCTION 
To our knowledge only one study (Kolb 1999) has formally examined the factors that 
determine the location of payday lenders within a geographic area, but that study focused on only 
a single city.6  State banking officials, payday industry supporters, and consumer advocacy 
groups also occasionally collect and analyze payday lending industry data, but in most cases these 
analyses focus on simple data summaries that fail to take into account the interrelationships 
among factors affecting the location of payday lenders.  Our statistical analysis attempts to sort 
out the factors influencing the location of payday lenders by systematically controlling for 
socioeconomic and demographic relationships that may be present in the data.     
                                                 
6 Kolb found concentrations of payday lenders in minority, working-class, moderate-income neighborhoods 
in Charlotte, North Carolina. 
 
Following Stegman and Faris (2003), our analysis focuses on payday lending and traditional 
banking data from North Carolina.7  Like Kolb, we explore the relationship between the location 
of banks and payday lenders and demographic/socioeconomic indicators across geographic areas; 
however, our analysis covers the entire state, dramatically expanding the number of observations 
and increasing the variability of the data.  By including all the regions of the state we believe that 
our results better represent the factors that affect the location of payday lenders and traditional 
banks and provide more general results. 
Payday lending data from North Carolina are particularly useful for analyzing the payday 
lending industry.  The North Carolina state legislature enacted legislation in 1997 allowing 
businesses to engage in “post-dated or delayed deposit check-cashing transactions” in the state 
but let the legislation expire in August, 2001.8  As part of the legislative review of this legislation 
the North Carolina Commissioner of Banks carried out extensive surveys of licensed North 
Carolina payday lending and check-cashing businesses in 1999 and 2000 (NC Commissioner of 
Banks 2001).  Data from this survey contain detailed information on the types of operations 
undertaken by individual companies (e.g., check-cashing only, payday lending only, both) as well 
as the number and characteristics of payday loan transactions by these companies.9   Information 
from this survey was merged with North Carolina Commissioner of Banks data listing individual 
check-casher (including payday loan) locations and names to create a master list of businesses 
providing payday lending services (with locations, by zip code) and operating in North Carolina 
                                                 
7 Given the lack of federal payday lending regulations, state-level data provides the best information about 
the payday lending industry.  Payday lenders are subject to a patchwork of state regulations that differ in 
their scope and depth.  See Consumer Federation of America and U.S. Public Interest Research Group 
(2001 Appendix A) for a state-by-state listing of payday lending regulations. 
8 As a result, North Carolina currently does not authorize payday lending. The original payday lending 
provision was included in North Carolina General Statute §53-281.  Currently, payday lenders in North 
Carolina operate under no specific state regulation, acting as affiliates of out of state banks. 
9 This survey data was obtained from Robert Faris on May 29, 2003.  Stegman and Faris (2003) use 
transaction volume data from this survey in their analysis of the payday lending industry.  Because this data 
is collected at the company rather than location level, we use only information on the type of activity each 
location engages in.  
 
in 2000.10  The resulting list was edited to remove inactive and recently opened locations (within 
last few months of 2001) using a comprehensive license list (with name and license number) 
provided to us by the North Carolina Commissioner of Banks. 
Data on the location of traditional banks was obtained from the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) web site, which allows users to query its database for a listing of all banks 
(and locations) in operation in a particular state and opened before a specific date.11  In June, 
2003 we obtained location information for all banks operating in North Carolina that were open 
prior to January 1, 2001.  One potential issue is that the banking data does not include banks that 
were open prior to 2001 but that closed between 2001 and 2003; however, this effect is likely to 
be minimal.  We removed several types of offices that are not consumer banking offices and 
assigned both banks and payday lenders to the zip codes in which they were located.  Note that 
some zip codes are assigned to a specific building or shopping center.  In these cases the 
institution was assigned to the zip code of the surrounding area to allow for matching with data 
obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau.  Zip codes in both data sets were double-checked and 
corrected using Microsoft Streets and Trips. 
Our analysis focuses on factors that are correlated with the location of payday lenders and 
traditional banks, in particular demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of population 
groups within geographic areas.  We obtained 2000 census data on a variety of demographic and 
socioeconomic variables from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Census 2000 Summary File 3 (SF3).12  
Numerical descriptive statistics summarized at the Zip Code Tabulation Area (ZCTA) level were 
                                                 
10 The NC Commissioner of Banks survey was conducted in 2001 and included payday lending data from 
2000.  The North Carolina Commissioner of Banks keeps a current listing of licensed check-cashers on its 
web site (http://www.banking.state.nc.us/cc/checkcas.htm); to develop a list of licensed check-cashers 
operating in 2000 we used the web service www.archive.org to obtain the list of check casher locations and 
names that appeared on the North Carolina Commissioner of Banks’ web site on February 19, 2001.   
11 Available at: http://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/main.asp 
12 SF3 contains detailed information from the census “long form”, collected from a 1-in-6 sample and 
weighted to represent the total population.   
 
used.  ZCTAs are designed to roughly approximate zip code delivery areas. 13  The Census 
Bureau also creates ZCTAs corresponding to parklands, lakes, etc. that are not covered by a zip 
code; these areas were deleted from the data set.  In addition, two zip codes were deleted that 
contained population, but curiously, no data on incomes or a few other key variables.  These two 
zip codes corresponded to UNC Charlotte and Wake Forest University.  Finally, twenty-one other 
anomalous ZCTAs reporting fewer than 100 residents were removed from the data set.  The final 
data set contains observations for 760 ZCTAs.  Table 1 contains a detailed description of the 
variables used in our analysis.  Ultimately, the Census data was merged with the payday lending 
and traditional banking data to develop a master data set organized by Zip Code Tabulation Area. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
We use the resulting data set to investigate the relationship between payday lender (or bank) 
location and demographic/socioeconomic characteristics across ZCTAs in North Carolina.  Given 
that the dependent variable is a count variable, we use Poisson regression to analyze these 
relationships.   Poisson regression relates dependent variable count data (in this case the number 
of payday lenders or banks located in a ZCTA) to a vector of independent variables, which here 
includes a variety of demographic and socioeconomic variables.  We carry out separate analyses 
for payday lenders and banks.  For small changes in the independent variables, the estimated 
coefficients of the Poisson regression model represent the proportionate change in the expected 
number of payday lenders (or banks) in a ZCTA.  We estimate a more general extension of the 
Poisson model, the negative binomial model, to obtain more accurate estimates of the standard 
errors of the coefficients when there is over-dispersion in the data.14  The resulting models are 
estimated by maximum likelihood techniques using LIMDEP statistical software.  In addition, we 
                                                 
13 ZCTAs sometimes differ from traditional zip codes. Simply put, each ZCTA is built by aggregating 
census blocks whose address are all of the same ZIP code.  In most instances the ZCTA code equals the 
ZIP Code for an area.  For more information, consult http://www.census.gov/geo/ZCTA/zcta.html. 
14 By definition, the Poisson distribution has a variance equal to its mean.  Over-dispersion describes a case 
in which the variance exceeds the mean. 
 
report two pseudo R-squared measures and an additional goodness of fit measure common for 
Poisson studies. 
Because these data contain explicit spatial relationships, ideally one should use a regression 
technique that accounts for possible spatial interaction between ZCTAs.  At the present time, 
there is no method for properly estimating spatial regressions with count data (Anselin 2003).  
Although several attempts have been made to develop approximate solutions, how close these 
approximations come to the “correct” answer is not well understood.15  If a moderate or large 
amount of spatial correlation exists, the failure to account for this in the estimation will lead to a 
type of omitted variable bias.  Our exploratory analyses of the data suggest that little residual 
spatial autocorrelation is present, and is unlikely to be causing significant bias in the estimates of 
our models.16 
4.  RESULTS 
Table 2 provides a statistical summary of the top decile of ZCTAs for both payday lenders 
and banks (per capita).  For each ZCTA, the number of payday lenders and banks was divided by 
the population of the ZCTA and the resulting per-capita values ranked from high to low.  Means 
and standard deviations of a variety of data for the ZCTAs representing the top ten percent of 
these values are reported in the table.  The first column reports statistics for the top ten percent of 
ZCTAs with the highest density of banks per capita while the second column reports statistics for 
the top ten percent of ZCTAs with the highest density of payday lenders per capita.  Comparing 
across columns, note that for the ZCTAs with the highest density of payday lenders, there are 
fewer banks per capita, a higher percentage of minorities, lower education levels, a higher 
                                                 
15 For example, the Prevention Research Center (part of the Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation) 
has developed an iteratively-reweighted GLS method (Gruenewald 2004). Christensen, Møller and 
Waagepetersen (2000) developed a Bayesian MCMC approach including relative distance as a covariate. 
16 For example, we calculate the spatial correlation (Moran’s I) on the residuals from the negative binomial 
regressions and examine log-linear OLS models including a spatial lag variable (see Cameron and Trivedi 
(1986, 1998) and McCullagh and Nelder (1989) for discussions of approximate OLS models to consider 
when Poisson models become intractable).  Both exercises indicate minor negative spatial correlation, 
although we cannot determine whether this correlation is statistically significant.  The results for the spatial 
OLS models indicate that the inclusion of a spatial lag variable has little effect on the values of the 
estimated coefficients in the model. Contact the authors for details. 
 
percentage of people in the military, more people receiving public assistance, a younger 
population, and more recent immigrants and others who are less likely to speak English compared 
to the ZCTAs with the highest density of banks.  In addition, the table makes it clear that payday 
lenders are disproportionately located in urban areas, where population densities are highest.  
These results are consistent with those published by CFA/PIRG (2001) and the popular press.  
However, simply looking at means of the data gives us an incomplete picture of the role these 
demographic and socioeconomic variables play in determining the location of payday lenders or 
banks in a geographic area.  To look at the interrelationships among these variables and their 
effect on the location of payday lenders and banks, we turn now to regression analysis. 
The results of the negative binomial regressions are presented in Table 3 and Table 4.  The 
pseudo R2 measures in each case are quite high; the models provide an excellent fit to the data.  
With respect to the estimated coefficients, in both regressions the percentage of housing units 
within a ZCTA classified as urban and the (log of) population are both positive, but both are 
statistically significant only in the payday lender equation.  The population coefficient estimate 
for banks is less than one, while the population coefficient for payday lenders is greater than one, 
suggesting that banks locate in a more decentralized manner, while payday lenders concentrate in 
high population ZCTAs.  
In these regressions we also included the (log of the) number of payday lenders in the bank 
regression and the (log of the) number of banks in the payday lender regression.  We wanted to 
determine if there was an overall complementarity or substitutability between these financial 
institutions.17  Given that these are both positive, each type of institution tends to locate in similar 
ZCTAs, ceteris paribus.  This may reflect an omitted variable, such as the occurrence of shopping 
or commercial areas within a ZCTA.  The GINI coefficient is positive and significant for both 
regressions.  Both types of financial institutions are more likely to be located in areas where there 
                                                 
17 For robustness purposes, we ran these regressions omitting these variables.  The qualitative nature of the 
results was unaffected.  We used the log form, converting all ZCTAs with values of zero to 0.5 before 
taking the natural logarithm.  
 
is more income inequality, ceteris paribus.  An ex-post explanation for this finding is that zip 
codes with retail districts in North Carolina often contain pockets of both high and low income 
neighborhoods.  Thus, areas with many retail establishments (banks, payday lenders, or other) are 
likely to have high income inequality. 
A particularly interesting result is that even when income, urban-ness, income-inequality, 
and education are controlled for, the coefficient on the percentage of blacks within a ZCTA is 
negative and significant in the bank regression, and positive and significant in the payday lender 
regression.  The results are consistent with those presented in Table 1 and support the commonly-
held view that payday lenders tend to locate in minority areas (and banks don’t).  Also striking is 
how close these coefficients are to 0.01.  Because the black race variable is measured in percent, 
these coefficients tell us that ceteris paribus, a one percentage point increase in the population that 
is black will reduce the number of banks by one percent and increase the number of payday 
lenders by one percent.  Note, however, that the coefficient on the Hispanic variable was not 
statistically significant in either the bank or payday lending regression models; however, the sign 
and size of the coefficient on this variable in the payday lender regression is similar to that of the 
black race variable.    
The results for the education variable are as expected.  We included the percentage of people 
in a ZCTA who have a four-year degree or higher education level (HIGHED) in our regression 
models and find that this variable is positively related to the number of banks in a ZCTA and 
negatively related to the number of payday lenders. 
As a measure of income, we use the natural log of median household income.  This variable 
does not help predict the number of banks in a ZCTA, but shows a negative relationship with the 
number of payday lenders.  Similarly, the percentage of households receiving some type of public 
assistance income exhibits no relationship with the number of banks located in a ZCTA, but has a 
negative relationship with the number of payday lenders.  These results are consistent with other 
 
research that has shown payday lenders locating not in the poorest neighborhoods but 
neighborhoods populated by the working poor. 
The coefficients on the age variables confirmed our beliefs that banks tend to locate in areas 
with older residents, while payday lenders locate in areas with a younger clientele who are more 
likely to use their services.  The p value of the coefficient of the 22-29 age group variable in the 
payday lender equation is a bit too high to be confident of a relationship, but is signed as 
expected.  The estimates for the home ownership and marriage variables in each regression 
model, however, are surprising.  Their signs are the opposite of what might be expected – both 
marriage and home ownership have a positive relationship with the number of payday lenders in a 
ZCTA and a negative effect on the number of banks.   
Finally, the signs of the coefficients on the military variable in each regression are 
noteworthy.  A negative and significant coefficient on this variable in the bank regression may 
indicate that banks are “crowded out” from military areas by the military credit unions.  It was 
expected that we would find a positive relationship between the percentage of people in a ZCTA 
that reported being in the military and the number of payday lenders in that ZCTA.  The resulting 
negative – although statistically insignificant – coefficient on the military variable was surprising 
to us (and runs counter to claims made by the CFA/PIRG) but may also indicate a type of 
crowding out.  Many military bases in North Carolina are surrounded by pawn brokers and other 
types of fringe banking services.  Since payday lenders are a more recent phenomenon, perhaps 
they face comparatively more competition than in other areas. 
Overall, the regression results suggest that demographic and socioeconomic factors drive the 
location of payday lenders and traditional banks in quite different ways.  In particular, ZCTAs 
with higher minority concentrations, younger populations, lower median incomes, and lower 
education levels are associated with a higher number of payday lenders, ceteris paribus, and a 
lower number of banks.   
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
At the outset of this paper we posed a series of questions that our analysis would address: (1) 
whether the analysis supports claims made by consumer advocacy groups about the factors 
affecting the location of payday lenders, (2) whether the factors driving the location of traditional 
banks and payday lenders differ, and (3) whether there is spatial complementarity or substitution 
between traditional banks and payday lenders.   In general, our results appear to confirm many of 
the general claims made about the location of payday lenders – payday lenders tend to locate in 
urban areas with relatively higher minority concentrations, younger populations, and less-well-
educated citizens.  However, we find that homeownership and marriage rates are positively 
related to the number of payday lenders in a ZCTA, while public assistance rates are negatively 
related to the number of payday lenders.  Both of these results run counter to perceived views 
about payday lenders preying on financially unsophisticated and vulnerable borrowers.   
As noted above, the estimated relationship between traditional bank locations and 
socioeconomic/demographic factors often differs markedly from that of payday lenders, yet there 
is a strong positive relationship between the number of payday lenders in a ZCTA and the number 
of traditional banks in the same geographic area.  This result suggests that there is a strong 
complementarity between the quantity of traditional and non-traditional banking services in an 
area.   
Overall, our location analysis is consistent with the claims made by consumer advocacy 
groups regarding the payday lending industry, although the analysis does not answer the question 
of whether payday lenders consciously locate in geographic areas to “take advantage” of 
unsuspecting borrowers or simply to meet the demands of the consumers located there.  Clearly, 
more research needs to be done to sort out the relative roles of demand- and supply-side factors 
responsible for the growth and location of payday lenders.  On the supply-side, consumer groups 
continue to push for greater payday lending restrictions, while federal regulatory agencies such as 
the  Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Office of Thrift 
Supervision have recently taken legal action against federally-chartered lenders that enlist payday 
 
lending partners.   In addition, federal agencies are updating CRA regulations in response to these 
concerns.  On the demand side, banks and other private-sector groups are promoting financial 
literacy programs and experimenting with innovative services that compete directly with those of 
payday lenders.  Whether such initiatives will reduce abusive lending practices and increase the 
availability of affordable credit to low-income and minority neighborhoods remains to be seen. 
Our analysis suggests that policymakers should continue to pay attention to the relative 
geographic distribution of banks and payday lenders and make greater efforts to understand the 
underlying factors that lead to the disparities that surface in our data.  Prudent policy decisions 
depend critically on this information. 
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TABLE 1 
 Variables Used in the Study 
Variable Description 
  
GINI :  A measure of income inequality, the Gini coefficient was calculated using 
income frequencies in SF3 variable P52 and total income data in P54.  
Method:  Using midpoints of the income ranges, estimates of cumulative 
relative income were calculated for reach range, as well as cumulative relative 
number of households.  The estimated cumulative relative incomes were 
corrected based on the known total income in the ZCTA.  The area under the 
cumulative income/household curve was approximated using two methods: 
The “right method” overestimates this area: 
   ∑ −−
i
i1ii )cumincomecumpop(cumpop
The “left method” underestimates this area: 
  ∑ −−
i
1-i1ii )cumincomecumpop(cumpop
These two estimates were averaged to get a more precise estimate of the area 
under the curve.  This area was subtracted from the total area of the triangle 
under the equal income line (.5), then divided by this area to compute the Gini 
coefficient. 
LOG POP:   Natural Logarithm of the total population in the ZCTA. 
HISP:  Percentage of individuals in the ZCTA responding as “a person of Cuban, 
Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or Central American, or other Spanish Culture 
or origin regardless of race” (OMB definition, 1997). 
WHITE:   Percentage of individuals in the ZCTA responding as white, but not Hispanic.
BLACK:  Percentage of individuals in the ZCTA responding as Black, African 
American, or Negro, but not Hispanic. 
HIGHED:  Percentage of individuals in the ZCTA reporting their highest level of 
educational attainment as more “Some College” or greater. 
LOG MED IN:  Natural Logarithm of median household income. 
PUB ASST:  Percentage of households who report receiving some kind of public assistance 
income. 
PERC URB:  Percent of the population in the ZCTA living in an area defined by the census 
as being an urbanized area. 
HOMOWN:  Percentage of households that are owned by those residing within. 
MARRY:  Percent of individuals fifteen and older who report being currently married. 
AXXYY:  Age ranges: Percentage of the individuals between the ages XX and YY:  
A2229, A3039 
  
 
 TABLE 2 
 
Descriptive Statistics (Top Deciles) 
  
Top Decile: 
Banks per Person* 
   
Top Decile: 
Payday Lenders 
 per Person* 
Variable Mean  Std. Dev.   Mean  Std. Dev. 
      
Banks/10,000 Population 11.90 8.70  4.06 4.36 
Payday Lenders/10,000 Pop. 0.83 1.79  3.88 2.33 
# of Banks 5.41 6.36  7.89 5.72 
# of Payday Lenders 1.11 2.99  7.00 4.23 
Population 6,499.00 8,833.95  21,235.09 13,257.39 
GINI Coefficient 0.45 0.05  0.45 0.05 
% Hispanic (Any Race) 2.80 3.43  5.02 4.28 
% White (Not Hisp.) 75.61 22.95  59.56 21.47 
% Black (Not Hisp.) 19.84 23.13  32.08 20.08 
% Am. Indian (Not Hisp.) 0.26 0.31  1.06 2.82 
% Asian or PI (Not Hisp.) 0.62 0.97  1.06 1.09 
% With less than HS Ed. 22.96 12.07  26.19 7.96 
% High School Grads. 28.63 8.76  29.75 4.81 
% with Some College 25.70 5.31  26.85 4.63 
% With 4 Year Degree 15.47 10.17  12.06 6.11 
% With > 4 Year Degree 7.24 6.27  5.15 3.10 
Median HH Income 36,250.05 12,034.06  33,575.17 6,708.17 
Per Capita Income 20,388.69 9,682.00  17,282.71 3,895.71 
% In Military 0.24 0.60  1.33 4.62 
% Labor Force Part. 59.14 9.91  62.43 6.71 
% Unemployed 7.33 9.33  6.68 3.23 
% Rec. Public Assistance 2.93 2.63  4.07 2.04 
% < Poverty Income 14.19 8.70  16.60 6.29 
% with 1 to 1.5 pov. Inc. 9.65 4.94  10.62 2.98 
% with 1.5 to 2 pov. Inc. 10.03 5.08  10.31 2.28 
% in Urban Area 36.86 44.23  64.08 31.03 
% Households Owned 55.10 16.74  57.45 12.20 
% Married 58.54 10.32  55.51 7.95 
% Speak English Poorly 1.70 2.40  3.21 3.25 
% Age 22-29 10.31 4.43  11.73 3.80 
% Age 30-39 13.81 3.78  15.01 2.32 
% Age 40-49 14.55 3.58  14.53 1.53 
% Age 50-59 12.52 3.55  10.97 2.03 
% Age 60+ 22.55 7.84  17.36 4.50 
Recent Immigrant, 5 years 1.21 1.57  2.34 2.62 
Recent Immigrant, 5-10 yrs. 0.57 0.96  0.99 0.96 
Population Density 692.19 1,046.07  753.61 1,059.90 
      
* Deciles contain 76 ZCTAs each.  
TABLE 3 
 
Negative Binomial Regression Results: Banking Model 
Dependent Variable: Banks 
Variable Coefficient Value 
Standard 
Error P-value 
    
Constant -5.155 3.012 0.087 
PERC URB 0.002 0.001 0.260 
LOG POP 0.859 0.049 0.000 
LOG PAYDAY 
LENDER 0.294 0.091 0.001 
GINI 3.186 0.909 0.000 
BLACK -0.008 0.003 0.001 
HISP 0.004 0.009 0.680 
HIGHED 0.009 0.005 0.053 
LOG MED IN -0.094 0.288 0.743 
PUB ASST -0.008 0.025 0.759 
A2229 -0.017 0.007 0.016 
A3039 -0.004 0.007 0.599 
HOMOWN -0.012 0.003 0.000 
MARRY -0.016 0.007 0.030 
MIL -0.015 0.006 0.021 
Dispersion 0.13   
    
 
Regression Diagnostics: 
 
Number of observations:   760  
Log likelihood function:*  -1217.206 
Restricted log likelihood:*  -1250.163 
Chi squared:*   65.913 
Degrees of freedom:*  1 
Prob[ChiSqd > value]*  0.0000000 
R-squared P:   .8089 
R-sqared D:   .7438 
Overdispersion tests: g=mu(i) 2.653 
Overdispersion tests: g=mu(i)2: 4.212 
 
 
* The restricted log likelihoods compare the 
Poisson model (restricted to mean=variance) 
to the negative binomial.  The χ2 test 
evaluates the appropriateness of the negative 
binomial model. 
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TABLE 4 
 
Negative Binomial Regression Results: Payday Lending Model 
Dependent Variable: Payday Lenders 
Variable Coefficient Value Standard Error P-value 
    
Constant 1.040 6.209 0.867 
PERC URB 0.015 0.002 0.000 
LOG POP 1.292 0.099 0.000 
LOG BANK 0.778 0.157 0.000 
GINI 3.542 1.748 0.043 
BLACK 0.011 0.004 0.009 
HISP 0.015 0.014 0.280 
HIGHED -0.025 0.009 0.004 
LOG MED IN -1.659 0.611 0.007 
PUB ASST -0.078 0.049 0.110 
A2229 0.018 0.012 0.147 
A3039 -0.013 0.014 0.358 
HOMOWN 0.015 0.009 0.081 
MARRY 0.016 0.012 0.201 
MIL -0.011 0.011 0.341 
Dispersion 0.185   
    
 
Regression Diagnostics: 
 
Number of observations  760  
Log likelihood function*  -649.074 
Restricted log likelihood*  -670.448  
Chi squared*   42.75 
Degrees of freedom*  1 
Prob[ChiSqd > value]*  0.0000000  
R-squared P:   0.7934 
R-sqared D:   0.7867 
Overdispersion tests: g=mu(i) 4.54 
Overdispersion tests: g=mu(i)2 7.140 
 
 
* The restricted log likelihoods compare the 
Poisson model (restricted to mean=variance) 
to the negative binomial.  The χ2 test 
evaluates the appropriateness of the negative 
binomial model. 
 
